INTRODUCTION
The control of information has been a central theme in consumer protection law and policy for decades. 1 In the panacea of the perfect market, consumers search for
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7 Ibid. 8 See eg Warning! Too Much Information can Harm (London: Better Regulation Executive/National Consumer Council, 2007). 9 Note in particular the publication of financial complaints data and the introduction of the National Food Hygiene Rating Scheme discussed below.
Adverse publicity may first be viewed as a sanction. Such publicity may be used as a formal sanction, for example in the form of public censure, or less formally, such as through press releases. 10 While this article focuses on (consumer protection) enforcers, it
should be noted that courts may also use adverse publicity as a sanction, for example by imposing a publicity order, and that such publicity may play a role in achieving other regulatory objectives, such as environmental protection. 11 As will become apparent, negative publicity may also emerge from general media coverage, independently of any regulatory action. To assess adverse publicity as a sanction, it is helpful to identify the principal aims of, and justifications for, such sanctioning.
Deterrence and compliance
The most obvious aim of sanctioning is to prevent future harm through deterrence. First, sanctioning a trader may deter him or her from further wrongdoing (individual deterrence). Secondly, that sanction may deter others from similar wrongdoing (general deterrence). Where consumer protection offences are concerned, deterrence is, perhaps, the most obvious rationale for sanctioning. Wells argues that: '[m]ost corporate crime theory has been deterrent-based, in the sense that the purpose of instituting sanctions has been to discourage violations and encourage good practice.' 12 However, deterrence does not always operate effectively in the context of consumer protection offences. To appreciate this, it is important to think about how a system of optimal deterrence would work. adverse publicity from the national media, and for smaller firms trading in localized markets where word of mouth could easily damage standing. 20 The research found that traders fear that existing and potential consumers might be alienated by noncompliance. Traders admitted that they sometimes changed behavior through fear of OFT investigation and prosecution. 21 Furthermore, as reputation is relevant to quality of products and service as well as to integrity, breaching civil as well as criminal standards might lead to loss of business. The research found the threat of adverse publicity to be crucial in motivating compliance, noting that that 89% of respondents agreed that: 'the threat of adverse publicity associated with breaching consumer law is as important as any financial penalty.' 22 Although there is some debate, a range of studies have demonstrated that adverse publicity typically impacts negatively upon the performance of firms.
Deterrence and financial factors
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Fisse and Braithwaite identified less direct ways in which adverse publicity harms the financial position of a trader. 24 For example, where a trader has a poor public image, it may be difficult to attract high-quality employees who are able to add value to the organisation. Furthermore, a poor image may make it more difficult, and therefore more expensive, to raise funds from financial institutions. In addition, traders with a positive image may find it easier to have influence. For example, it may be that those traders who have a high image will find it easier to influence governments, for example to pass or to drop legislation that impacts upon their interests. 25 It has even been suggested that previous wrongdoing will be treated more leniently where there is a strong reputation. Finally, it has been argued that a trader's prestige has an impact upon its 20 OFT Drivers of compliance and non-compliance with consumer law (A report by Ipsos MORI) OFT 1225a, May 2010 para 1.9. 21 OFT above n 17, para 1.19. 22 Ibid para 1.21 23 See in particular C Alexander "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence" (1999) 42 J Law and Econ 489. 24 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10, p 248. 25 A Cowan "Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity under the New Sentencing Guidelines" (1991-92) 65 S Cal LR 2387 at 2398 morale and self-esteem, including those of its employees, with the financial benefits that result.
We can therefore conclude that adverse publicity may operate more effectively as a deterrent than traditional formal sanctions. However, firms will also wish to avoid adverse publicity for other reasons.
Deterrence, compliance and non-financial factors
A distinction might be drawn between deterrence and compliance. "Deterrence" implies that in the absence of the threat of a sanction, traders will decide rationally to engage in wrongdoing where that is financially beneficial. But traders may want to comply with the law for a range of reasons. First, habit may lead to compliance, Ayres and Braithwaite noting that 'most corporate actors will comply with the law most of the time because it is the law'. 26 Secondly, there is the symbolism attached to breaches of the law, particularly criminal law, which leads firms to try to comply. Ball and Friedman found that the word very word crime 'has symbolic meaning for the public and the criminal law is stained so deeply with notions of morality and immorality, public censure and punishment, that labelling an act as criminal often has consequences that go far beyond mere administrative effectiveness'. They conclude that 'businessmen abhor the idea of being branded a criminal'. 27 The language of deterrence might be used here, but compliance results in part from a desire to be seen as acting within the law. incentives not to deliberately break consumer laws, but also to minimize the likelihood that they will accidentally break them. Many unintended offences could be avoided if further effort and resources were put into organisation, supervision and planning.
Adverse publicity may provide an incentive for firms to minimize the risk of such unintended wrongdoing.
Retribution and just deserts
Under retributive (sometimes called 'just deserts') theories, wrongdoers are sanctioned because they deserve to be, not simply because their penalty is likely to have particular consequences such as reducing future offending. 37 The trader is therefore sanctioned irrespective of whether it reforms his character, deters his conduct or sets an example to others. 38 Although retributive theories are sometimes associated with the political right, just deserts is founded on respect for the individual, ensuring that sanctions are fair, determinate, and proportionate.
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Adverse publicity might be justified on the basis of retributive theories. We may inform the public of wrongdoing in order to reflect traders' culpability -to 'name and shame' those who deserve such approbation. Indeed, it has been argued that to secure appropriate retribution, any punishment 'must be public and must attempt to shame the This will occur only rarely.
When viewed as a sanction, adverse publicity may therefore be justified on a number of bases. Most obviously, it may operate as a deterrent, either replacing or supplementing other sanctions such as fines. However on appropriate facts it is also possible to justify the use of adverse publicity to achieve other goals. One question to consider is how adverse publicity enforcement authorities might choose to use adverse publicity (or the threat of such publicity) as part of different enforcement strategies in practice.
Adverse publicity and enforcement strategies
When enforcers are faced with wrongdoing they have a choice about how to proceed, but it is clear that that formal action will generally be viewed as a last resort. Legislation sometimes requires the first course of action to be informal. For example, regulation It has been noted that adverse publicity may follow from, or form part of, a formal sanction. But such publicity may play an important role in a compliance strategy. An enforcer might, for example, suggest that a trader acknowledges wrongdoing as part of an informal settlement with consumers. Sometimes, a trader will genuinely reflect on conduct, recognise wrongdoing, and publicly acknowledge the need for change. Neither requires formal sanctioning powers to be utilised. For example, the RES Act envisages that traders will be incentivised to bring contraventions to the attention of enforcers and suggest solutions through a procedure of enforceable undertakings. A public acknowledgement of wrongdoing may form part of the undertaking. 56 It is also possible for enforcers to threaten adverse publicity in the absence of formal enforcement action.
While it could be argued that such a threat 'gives enforcers an ace to play' and that any unjust publicity is a 'relatively trivial problem', such a view should be treated with caution. 57 The need to provide procedural safeguards for traders counsels against the widespread use of informal publicity without compelling proof of wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, at different stages of the enforcement process, there may be a role for adverse publicity. To understand how enforcement authorities use their powers in practice, it is helpful to look at some examples.
Adverse publicity in practice: the Financial Services Authority and the Office of Fair Trading
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the UK's leading regulator of the financial services industry, and has consumer protection as one of its statutory objectives. 58 The FSA will generally publicise enforcement action, such as final notices, and its success in obtaining civil remedies, such as injunctions and restitution orders. It will also consider making public announcements at key stages of criminal proceedings, while being mindful not to prejudice the fairness of any subsequent trial. Emphasising what consumers and firms should be alert to will also help to achieve these objectives. Some of these points are developed below.
As well as managing the publicity of enforcement action though press releases, the FSA can also use public censures as a formal disciplinary tool as an alternative to financial penalties. 60 The FSA's Guidance sets out the factors to be considered when deciding whether to impose public censure rather than a financial penalty. For example, the first factor is whether deterrence can be achieved effectively through a public censure. This is discussed further below. A second factor is whether the person has profited from, or avoided a loss from, the breach. A third factor is seriousness, with financial penalties rationale for this is stated to be deterrence. Seventh, the FSA will look to ensure consistency in its approach, by considering previous cases. Finally, the FSA will consider the impact upon the person concerned. The factors reveal that public censure alone will typically be used in less serious cases, which may appear surprising given the deterrent effect of adverse publicity. However, two points should be noted. First, the imposition of a financial penalty will not mean that the firm is immune from adverse publicity as this will be communicated via a press release. Secondly, the FSA is able (and has shown itself willing in appropriate cases) to impose far more significant financial penalties than most authorities.
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The Office of Fair Trading also uses adverse publicity as part of its enforcement toolkit.
Like the FSA, the OFT sets out the rationale behind its use of publicity. It states that 'wherever possible and appropriate' the OFT publicises the outcomes of proceedings, particularly important given the nature of undertakings and the need for consumer input to help to monitor the conduct of the trader. The OFT will conduct regular reviews of trader behaviour in relation to undertakings and orders that have been obtained, but relies upon third parties to provide it with information about the extent to which a trader continues to comply with an undertaking. This information might come from consumers or from bodies such as Consumer Direct. As explained in more detail below, adverse publicity may be helpful in alerting consumers to the wrongdoing of particular traders and encouraging consumers to report any further breaches.
The OFT regime has come in for some criticism, being described by the OECD as 'not the negative role that other intervention might have in contributing to market failure.
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By focusing on these issues, scholars could identify how regulation is best designed to improve the functioning of the market. Many regulators describe their approaches as 'market based' and some see market failure as the justification for regulation. 67 The need to correct the information asymmetry that exists between suppliers and consumers has been a major, and perhaps the dominant, narrative in consumer law and policy across the globe.
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There is now a wealth of evidence that consumers do not play the role traditionally ascribed to them by classical economic theory. Many recent studies in behavioural economics have challenged traditional assumptions about how consumers make decisions. 69 For example, it is suggested that: consumers' preferences vary over time (usually with a preference for the short term); they tend to be over-optimistic; they respond very differently depending upon how questions are presented, and they tend to use heuristics (rules of thumb) to assess factors such as risk. 70 These findings counsel caution about the extent to which we focus on simply correcting information asymmetry in the hope and expectation that this will lead to consumers' making informed choices in their own interests. Whether we believe that consumers are rational maximisers of their own utility, or view them instead as typically displaying cognitive biases, there is broad agreement that the information consumers would need to make a fully informed choice is likely to be absent from many markets. The reasons for this need not trouble us here, and have been examined at length in the literature. 71 Our focus is instead on the role that adverse publicity might play in improving consumer choice and decision-making.
Adverse publicity may be viewed as a tool to ensure that consumers are informed about matters that might affect their decisions. Research suggests that to make informed choices, consumers need information about price, quality and terms of trade and that an unregulated market may not always provide this. 72 Adverse publicity may help to inform consumers about the quality of the provider, for example by informing them about wrongdoing. Consumer sovereignty is respected, as a consumer for whom the integrity or competence of a supplier is important can be informed about that. This helps the consumer to exert market discipline. The issuing of press releases about enforcement action is traditionally seen as principally part of the sanctioning process, but as the examples of the FSA and OFT above demonstrate, they may equally be seen as helping consumers to make informed choices.
Adverse publicity as information: beyond breaches of the law?
The discussion above assumes that the trader has breached the law and that the adverse publicity will reflect that. Where a firm breaches the criminal law, it is relatively easy to convey this in a press release or similar communication. Similarly, where a trader has been is in breach of other clear minimum standards, conveying this will be comparatively straight forward. However, if we view adverse publicity through the lens of consumer information, we may need to go further. consumerism literature and matters deemed by the press to be of concern to consumers by one leading study revealed sixteen such social and ethical issues. 76 If we accept that consumers need information about some such matters to make informed choices, we have to identify which to publicise. A second difficulty is that even if we can identify the matters of most concern to consumers, using adverse publicity to inform them of which firms or products perform poorly on such matters will be problematic. As there is no single accepted standard which a firm can be said to have breached, firms may rightly object to 'poor performance' being conveyed as reprehensible. In particular, adverse publicity may not communicate effectively the tradeoffs involved with some apparently unethical conduct. For example, some products may involve a substantial carbon 73 S Brooker Regulation and Reputation (London: NCC, 2006) p 7. 74 Ibid, p 1. 75 Ibid, p 3. 76 These were: (1) animal rights in product testing; (2) the use of animal by-products; (3) product biodegradability; (4) products made from recyclables; (5) the provision of product safety information; (6) human rights; (7) packaging recyclability; (8) product disposability; (9) the payment of minimum wages; (10) whether unions are allowed; (11) whether minimum living conditions are met; (12) sexual orientation rights; footprint, but bring important business to impoverished producers. It is not possible comprehensively to label many products simply in terms of social or ethical criteria.
Recent research by the Better Regulation Executive and National Consumer Council
suggests that authorities should be cautious in their use of regulated information, and that the disclosure of complex information is particularly unappealing for consumers. 77 It found general agreement that 'information provision that made choices more complicated was unlikely to be successful.'
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A third difficulty is that even where consumers say that matters concern them and are provided with information about them, it is not clear how far they act upon them.
Devinney Auger and Eckhardt found that while consumers typically claim significant interest in such issues, they generally do not act accordingly, and that 'providing people with information about the social issues did not seem to influence their choice.' 79 If this is correct, publicizing such matters may be neither effective as a sanction, nor useful in improving market discipline.
A final and significant difficulty in relying on adverse publicity to deliver social and ethical information is that to the extent that consumers care about ethical and related issues, they want to know those players in the market who perform well in addition to those who perform poorly. By definition, adverse publicity focuses on the latter. There is an argument for any regime that emphasises information and consumer choice to be more comprehensive. As will be seen below, there is a welcome movement in regulation towards the provision of such information.
Adverse publicity as information: rights redress and feedback
As well as helping consumers to make informed purchasing choices, adverse publicity may also provide useful post contractual information. The RES Act contains a number of provisions which may involve the use of publicity to ensure consumers receive redress. Traders are able to offer enforcement undertakings to enforcers which involve, in Macrory's words 'the potential of imposing fit for purpose sanctions which are more satisfying for both offender and victims of non-compliance.'
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The action that the business can undertake must be: to ensure the offence does not continue or recur; to secure that the position is restored (so far as possible) to where it would have been without the offence; to pay money to benefit anyone affected by the offence; or other actions specified by the minister in the order. 82 Where a trader is offering to restore a position or pay compensation, it is likely that s/he will also have to publicise this in order to bring it to the attention of those affected. The other RES Act power of particular relevance is the restoration requirement (an example of what the Act calls Discretionary Requirements). Under this provision, an enforcer may give a trader a notice which sets out the steps the trader must take to restore the position (so far as possible) to where it would have been had the offence not been committed. 83 In many cases, this will involve publicising the original wrongdoing and the redress or similar arguing that informing the public about the activities of an enforcement authority improves the image of the authority and, and as result, aids compliance. 88 Similarly, the Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission accepts that an aim of adverse publicity is to enhance the transparency and accountability of his organisation's work. 89 As noted above, adverse publicity might help to educate consumers, not just about the firm in question, but about common problems within a sector.
PART THREE: RE-CONCEIVING ADVERSE PUBLICITY
The risks and rewards of adverse publicity
The discussion above has outlined the role of adverse publicity as sanction and information tool, while recognising that the distinction between these is imperfect. It is important now to draw the themes from the discussion above, and to consider how the concerns may be addressed.
The article has identified deterrence and compliance as the principal aims of adverse publicity when examined through the lens of sanctioning. Adverse publicity should deter traders from deciding to engage in wrongdoing (broadly interpreted) and incentivise them to take precautions to avoid unintentionally producing the harm that would lead to such publicity. There is some evidence that regulatory offences are not always taken seriously, either by the perpetrators or by the public. 91 While this is probably because of the very low formal sanctions that are typically imposed, it may also be because relatively little stigma attaches to their commission. There is also evidence that consumers do not always take what might be described as social and ethical matters into account when making purchasing decisions. While these are of concern, they may be overstated. There seems little doubt that firms take negative publicity very seriously, and there is evidence that some forms of adverse publicity are likely to have a significant impact upon consumer decision-making.
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Of more concern is the argument that adverse publicity may operate disproportionately as a penalty, particularly because it is so difficult to control. Coffee describes it as 'something of a loose cannon', arguing that 'its exact impact cannot be reliably estimated nor is it controllable so that only the guilty are affected.' He concludes that 'it seems easier to rely on even cash fines in preference to the wholly unpredictable impact of a legal stigma.' 93 Whitman also notes the potential for adverse publicity to be disproportionate, suggesting that 'once the state stirs up public opprobrium against an offender it cannot really control the way the public treats that offender.' He thereby concludes that this risks conferring 'too much enforcement power on a fickle and uncontrolled general populace'. 94 More recently, the Better Regulation Task Force raised concerns about the potential for adverse publicity to operate unfairly.
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There are difficulties balancing the deterrent value of adverse publicity with the need for sanctioning to be proportionate. Yeung suggests that publicity is likely to aid deterrence, 91 Borrie argued that fines are sometimes viewed by traders as "tiresome pinpricks, minor inconveniences that are shrugged off and the fines put down as a business expense." Gordon Borrie but that this may come at the expense of proportionality. 96 Van Erp also emphasises fairness and proportionality, but she notes practical, as well as ideological, objections to any excess stigma that arises from adverse publicity. Where any form of sanctioning is excessive there is a danger that it will produce defiance. 97 The sense of grievance is likely to be particularly great where the media sensationalises the story, or its significance is otherwise misconstrued or exaggerated by the public. Any such defiance will make the regulator's task of securing compliance particularly difficult.
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By contrast, Fisse and Braithwaite argue that to assume that the impact of a sanction must be finite and proportionate to the relevant offence is false: 'the most that is required to satisfy the principle of proportionality is formal proportionate quantification of sentence in advance, irrespective of the degree of impact upon an offender.' 99 This seems a weak defence. If the effect of an enforcer's conduct is disproportionate to any wrongdoing, then it should consider forbearance. However, adverse publicity may result from a trader being sanctioned without that publicity being sought by the enforcer. Some publicity is inevitable, and this may not accurately reflect the degree of culpability on behalf of the trader. The advantage of having the enforcer control adverse publicity is that it helps to manage the way that publicity results and thus guards against disproportionality. The use of the internet to shape reputations raises particular concern.
Rumour and conjecture may do significant damage to traders, and this may not be easily undone. At its most serious, traders may be subjected to a form of 'brand assassination.' 100 Fairness may lead us to a regime which carefully considers and controls how information is communicated. from regulators is surely preferable to the rumour mill.' 101 The question is not whether negative publicity should be generated. Instead, the focus should be on (a) how it might be generated; and (b) how it can best be managed.
Another concern is whether adverse publicity is helpful when so much enforcement activity is informal and based upon compliance strategies. The emphasis on compliance is striking in consumer protection law, and there will be a limited role for adverse publicity as part of a compliance regime. However, while that role may be limited, it will nevertheless be important. Compliance strategies take place against the background of the threat of sanctioning. Given the potential for adverse publicity to operate as a deterrent it has a role in a regime that emphasises compliance. However, there is concern that compliance strategies depend upon the existence of trust and co-operation between regulator and regulated. Where traders fear that regulators will be too ready to generate adverse publicity, they may be reticent to disclose evidence of wrongdoing. The powers being tested by the Civil Sanctions Pilot will be influential here. It seems likely that the existence of sanctioning tools will be sufficient to persuade many traders to do as the enforcer's request, and this is likely to involve either the enforcer, or the trader, publicising the latter's actions.
When examining adverse publicity as information, a number of concerns are evident. are subject to a public interest test. However, there is evidence that some enforcement authorities felt prohibited from disclosing information by part nine of the Enterprise Act.
While there was some reason to show caution, research has concluded that regulatory practice was rather more cautious that was required by the legislation. 105 It should be noted that under the RES Act, enforcers will be required to publish details of any enforcement action, such as where a civil sanction is imposed or an undertaking accepted. The Guidance to the Act suggests that enforcers might append a list of cases taken in an annual report or maintain a database of sanctioning decisions taken.
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While this does not restrict other publicity options available such as the issuing of press releases, it may signal a move towards more systematic reporting of enforcement action.
Adverse publicity and positive publicity: towards an optimal balance
It is vital that where consumers are invited to act upon adverse publicity, whether it is presented as a sanction or merely as information, they are able to see that information The FSA defines a complaint as: "any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, about the firm's provision of (or failure to provide) a financial service which alleges that the customer has suffered (or may suffer) financial loss, material distress or material inconvenience." Firms are not obliged to report complaints that are resolved to the customer's satisfaction by the close of the business day after the complaint was made.
Principle six of the FSA's 'Principles for Businesses' requires each firm to 'pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.' A report for the FSA identified certain principles which reflected the consumer perspective on fairness. Among those were 'do your best to resolve mistakes as quickly as possible' and 'do not take advantage of the customer'. The report also found a view that 'providers are quick to charge customers for their mistakes but less ready to pay out in recognition of their own errors.' 110 Other studies have suggested how fairness in the firm-consumer relationship might be conceived, with redress again looming large. 111 Against this background, the publication of complaints data may be used as a proxy indicator of fairness.
It is clear that the FSA intends consumers to use this information in choosing firms. It should be viewed alongside the publication by the Financial Ombudsman Service of complaints with which it deals, as the FOS receives complaints only after consumers have not been able to obtain satisfaction from a firm. The combined information provides a helpful indication of how firms deal with complaints. Given that this is something which matters to consumers, it will assist them in making informed choices as well as providing compelling incentives on firms to improve. There is some evidence of the media picking up the data and, in some cases, displaying it prominently. The Hampton Report had emphasised the role of positive incentives in securing compliance, and urged the Better Regulation Executive to encourage regulators to adopt positive incentives schemes. 114 The Scheme provides a compelling incentive for firms to improve their hygiene ratings so that they can advertise this. It is clear that consumers take food hygiene very seriously, with a snap shot survey carried our recently for the FSA indicating that 8 per cent of consumers regard hygiene standards to be extremely important when eating out. Those interviewed used proxy indicators of hygiene such as appearance (both of staff and the establishment) to make decisions. In the words of the FSA's Chairman 'we wanted to give people the ability to judge for themselves whether they considered the hygiene standards of a food outlet to be good enough.'
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The Scheme offers a glimpse of how reputation may be used as a tool of consumer protection policy. It has certain clear attractions. First, it provides information on quality which a large proportion of consumers state is relevant to their decision-making.
Secondly, rather than focusing solely on information that impacts negatively upon a trader, it also provides positive information that will reassure consumers. In so doing, it provides a very clear incentive upon traders to make food hygiene as a matter of priority. While the media are likely to pick up on poor scores, consumers are able to search for traders with higher ratings. The Scheme is likely, therefore, to operate both as a sanction and as an informational tool.
An obvious limitation of the Scheme is that as there is no compulsion on traders to disclose ratings, only those who score highly will publicise these ratings. 116 The ratings of all firms will be available, but only online. It is likely that tables of food outlets will be compiled, and so information will become more readily available. However, in this respect it compares unfavourably with schemes such as the Restaurant Hygiene Quality
Cards system which was established in Los Angeles County in 1997. The Los Angeles scheme required restaurants to publicise in their front windows the grade that reflected inspection findings. It has been stated that in the Scheme: 'a restaurant's grade is available when users need it, at the time when they make a decision about entering the establishment; where they need it, at the location where purchase of a meal will take place; and in a format that makes complex information quickly comprehensible.' 117 There is evidence that those restaurants with high grades received increases in revenue, while those with low grades suffered. In addition, research found a reduction in hospitalisations as a result of food-related illnesses as a result of increases in the quality of hygiene. 118 traders being able to demonstrate publically that they have addressed the noncompliance that led to the earlier rating. This also guards against the potential for the Scheme to operate disproportionately.
It is too early to tell how successful the consumer complaints and Food Hygiene Rating schemes will be. Their rationale has been warmly greeted in some quarters. For example, it has been suggested that 'by providing consumers with independent information about quality indicators -such as compliance rates or upheld complaintsour regulatory institutions can help to square the virtuous circle and promote consumer power.' 121 The Food Hygiene Ratings Scheme in particular is to be welcomed as an information tool, given the way in which it provides information which is of considerable interest to consumers in a clear and readily understandable manner. It also provides significant incentives to traders to take steps to improve their hygiene. The publication of complaints data is less compelling as an information tool. The information is more difficult for consumers to understand, and firms can legitimately claim that it might in some cases provide a misleading picture of the firm's treatment of consumers.
Nevertheless, as a way of incentivising firms to improve their complaints handling, there is no doubt that it plays a role.
CONCLUSIONS
It is inevitable that traders will sometimes act in a way that generates adverse publicity.
Where their conduct receives the attention of enforcers, those authorities have to consider how they will use such publicity to achieve regulatory objectives. In the context of consumer protection, adverse publicity may be used in two principal ways. First, it may be used as or alongside a sanction, as part of the enforcement process. It has potential to operate as a compelling deterrent, and while there are concerns that it may potentially operate in a disproportionate manner, if it is carefully managed, it should incentivise traders to meet the requirements of the regimes under which they operate.
Secondly, adverse publicity may be used to attempt to correct the information asymmetry that exists between traders and consumers. Publicising sanctions imposed on traders helps to inform consumers about definable and potentially significant matters, such as the trader's wrongdoing, the standards the enforcer expects and, where appropriate, the action that a consumer should take to obtain redress. Publicising social and ethical matters and performance standards is more problematic, particularly where that conduct does not fall foul of the law. There is a danger that consumers will not see the information is context and that the publicity will either be unfair to traders, or unhelpful to consumers.
The recent initiatives by the Financial Services Authority and the Food Standards Agency reveal how it is possible to develop regimes which inform consumers and raise standards. While neither is perfect, they demonstrate how adverse publicity may be generated alongside more favourable information in a manner that consumers can use.
